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The
"Pump and Dump" Method for Handling Closers Jody Madron has been in the publishing business for over a decade and has acted as a publisher for over a dozen newsletters (mostly in the financial/investment arena). He is a former sports reporter for the Cecil Whig and previously co-hosted a weekly sports talk show in Maryland, which included post-game analysis on on the local Baltimore Orioles affiliate station. He can be reached at jmadron2003@aol.com. The
“Pump and Dump” Method For Handling Closers One
of the more interesting stories to emerge during the early part of the
2003 baseball season has been the release of Moneyball, Michael
Lewis’ insightful look at Billy Beane and the Oakland A’s, and the
subsequent reaction throughout the major leagues. One
idea presented in Lewis’ book that is worth further examination involves
the role of the closer and how it is possible to use this position to
develop – and then trade off at a “profit” – closers year after
year. Here is the theory as
presented in the book: “Established closers were systematically overpriced, in large part because of the statistic by which closers were judged in the marketplace: “saves.” The very word made the guy who achieved them sound vitally important. But the situation typically described by the save – the bases empty in the ninth inning with the team leading – was clearly far less critical than a lot of other situations pitchers faced. The closer’s statistic did not have the power of language; it was just a number. You could take a slightly above average pitcher and drop him into the closer’s role, let him accumulate some gaudy number of saves, and then sell him off. You could, in essence, buy a stock, pump it up with false publicity, and sell it off for much more than you’d paid for it. Billy Beane had already done it twice, and assumed he could do so over and over again.” -- from Moneyball, by Michael Lewis Looking
back at Oakland’s recent history in the saves category, it’s easy to
see exactly what Beane was up to. Billy
Taylor saved 26 games for the A’s in 1999 and was traded to the New York
Mets. Jason Isringhausen then
became the A’s closer and saves 67 games in two years…only to be let
go. And last year Billy Koch
saved 44 games for Oakland before being dealt for Keith Foulke.
In
each case, Beane successfully “pumped up” the price of his closer’s
stock and then received solid value in return.
It’s also worth noting that he also successfully replaced each
closer that he let go. So, in
a sense, Beane has “created” value for his team, which is very
important when you’re being asked to compete with other clubs whose
resources are more than double your own. Does the “Pump and Dump” Work For Rotisserie Owners?The
idea is certainly an interesting one; a concept that has worked well for
Beane and the A’s within the parameters they’re forced to operate in
order to stay competitive. So
now that Beane’s ideas and methodology have become public knowledge, the
question becomes: is it possible to replicate Beane’s “Pump and
Dump” closer strategy successfully in Rotisserie Baseball?
And if so, how would such a strategy be executed? To
answer the question of whether or not Beane’s idea is a viable one for
Rotisserie owners, let’s take a moment to examine the volatility of the
closer position. No matter
your opinion of the save statistic as it’s currently constructed, the
fact remains that it is one of either four or five pitching categories in
nearly every Rotisserie league in existence. Closers: A 50-50 PropositionThrough
games of June 29, there were 21 closers in the major leagues who had
registered 14 or more saves. Of
that group, slightly more than half – just 11 out of 21 – finished in
the Top 20 in saves last season. To
put that another way, only about half of the Top 20 closers from
2002 – in terms of saves – were contributing at the same level
relative to the rest of the league in 2003.
Among
the nine pitchers who have dropped off of the “Top 20 Saves List” are
three who had been converted to starters: Kelvim Escobar, Byung-Hyun Kim
and Danny Graves. Likewise,
four others – Robb Nen, Trevor Hoffman, Kazuhiro Sasaki and Jason
Isringhausen – can have their disappearance explained by injuries.
The
other two who have slipped are Billy Koch (who just barely missed,
checking in at #23 on the 2003 saves list) and Juan Acevedo, who went from
28 saves in 2002 to losing his job…in TWO different cities. No
matter the explanation, however, a “turnover rate” of nearly 50% is
still somewhat alarming. Unless
you have somehow landed a Smoltz, Gagne or Guardado, it’s a safe bet
that you have found yourself scrambling for saves at some point during the
past year or two. Part
One: How can I get “cheap saves”? As
the volatility of the closer position demonstrates, accumulating points in
the saves category requires a Rotisserie owner to either: (1) acquire one
or more top-flight closers, or (2) become very resourceful.
In
order to take full advantage of this idea, you must do two things.
First, you need to acquire closers at deep discounts.
And second, you need to trade away these closers when their
value is at or near its peak. You’ll
notice that this first part of the plan – acquiring closers at deep
discounts – is slightly different than the first part of Beane’s
strategy with the A’s. But
that’s by necessity. As
Rotisserie owners, we have no control (unless you have the same access to
major league managers that Beane has) over which big league pitchers get
save opportunities. So we’re
forced to anticipate which pitchers may become closers in the near
future. This
is a bit of a risky proposition, of course.
You’ll need to set aside one or two of the pitching slots on your
roster for “closer development”. Those
are the spots you should look to fill from a pool of potential closers
rather than mediocre starting pitchers and/or middle relievers who provide
very little value. Just
how well might you be rewarded? Let’s
go back to the list of pitchers with 14 or more saves in 2003.
Among the names on that list are: Rocky Biddle (22 saves), Keith
Foulke (21), Mike MacDougal (20), Scott Williamson (18), Tim Worrell (17)
and Joe Borowski (15). With
these names in mind, think back to the last two months of the 2002 season.
None of these players held down a regular closer job at that time,
so they could have easily been picked up at bargain prices. If
you look around the league, you’ll find some teams – such as Los
Angeles, Atlanta and Minnesota – with bullpens that appear to be cast in
stone. But in many cases,
you’ll find a potentially unsettled situation that might lead to an
opportunity for you to grab cheap saves.
Here are four examples to consider:
Again,
I have only presented a handful of opportunities in this space.
And I’ve presented fairly obvious examples so as to illustrate my
point. A more thorough look at
the bullpens around the league will yield plenty of opportunities,
depending upon the competitiveness of your league. In
addition, some clubs that appear to have more stable closers in place –
such as Seattle and the Yankees – may be more unsettled than you might
think because of injury. Keep
your eyes open for opportunities and remember that you could very easily
“steal” a 40-save man in 2004 with shrewd roster management in the
second half of 2003. Part Two: Be Sure You Sell HighAnother
aspect to the idea favored by Billy Beane involves “selling off” a
closer for much more than your original investment…and then repeating
the process all over again. This
may be a painful idea to consider as emotions sometimes tend to cloud the
judgment of even the best Rotisserie players.
It may prove difficult to part with a closer you “discovered”
and held onto for months until he was awarded the job.
Those emotions need to be put aside.
Case in point: Juan
Acevedo. In 2002, this 31-year
old right-hander suddenly went from journeyman reliever to Tigers closer
when Matt Anderson was injured. Almost
overnight, Acevedo, who had saved just nineteen games total in six
previous seasons, emerged as a viable fantasy option, racking up 28
saves for a Detroit team that won just 55 games all season long. Generally
speaking, there are two “rules of thumb” from which you can choose to make
sure you never hold onto a newly discovered closer past the point of no
return. The
first “rule” is to be sure to trade the player at the time he’s
awarded the job. For
example, when Kelvim Escobar was moved back into the rotation earlier this
season, Toronto anointed Cliff Politte its new closer.
At
that point, a shrewd owner who had been holding Politte in the hope of his
becoming a closer could have shopped him around to his fellow owners to
see what could be obtained in return.
Typically, there is a certain amount of hype surrounding a new
closer taking over – positive articles in the papers, a profile on ESPN,
etc. – that may artificially inflate the player’s value.
The
second rule for “selling high” is to trade the player after an initial
burst of success. In the case
of a closer, a stretch of three saves in a week or perhaps a half-dozen
consecutive successful save opportunities might be enough to drive up the
player’s value. Trading
a closer as early as I am suggesting is a difficult thing to do.
After all, in your attempt to “sell high” you may potentially
let a superstar closer get away at a price that, years from now, will be
judged far too low. But
given the extreme volatility of the saves category – remember, only
about half of the 2002 saves leaders are performing at the same rate this
season – it is a risk that is very much worth taking. Conclusion: Buying Low and Selling High Requires Some Hard WorkRemember
– the point of the “Pump and Dump” method is to create value simply
through your own research and roster management.
You may not have the same disadvantage that Billy Beane does, but
by creating value and then taking advantage of it, you will have
given yourself a distinct advantage over your fellow owners. There
are risks involved, of course, when attempting to execute the “Pump and
Dump” method of acquiring saves. Here
is a brief recap of the three most prominent risks:
These risks, of course, are fairly minimal. The one or two roster spots you set aside for potential closers are most likely being held right now by pitchers who are not actually helping your staff. You might be holding on to a fourth or fifth starter who could be hurting your ERA and/or WHIP…or you might have a setup man who gives you no more value than one of the potential closers worth considering. As
for maintaining some consistency in the save category, this can also be
done with ease. Just be sure
that you always retain at least one active closer that is not part of this
“Pump and Dump” strategy and you should do fine. Lastly,
as for the risk of ridicule, I’ll simply say this: For every Eric Gagne
who appears on the scene, there are at least two Juan Acevedos.
So while we might be able – in some cases, anyway – to tell the
difference ahead of time, that’s not always the case.
In the end, the numbers suggest you have about a 50 percent chance
of getting equal production from one year to the next. |